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1. Introduction 
 
The knowledge economy is generally invoked as the key to progress, development and 
prosperity. Since the work of Schumpeter (1934; 1942), knowledge production and innovation 
have been identified as distinctive features of market economies, crucial to overcome societal 
inertia and, as later recognized by Abramovitz’ (1959) and Solow’s (1960) seminal 
contributions, more relevant than capital accumulation to explain growth. A recent strand of 
research has, however, emphasized that the present institutions of the knowledge economy, far 
from being infallible engines of economic growth, embody features that may lead to their own 
demise, resulting in stagnant growth.  
The key to understanding why the endgame of the knowledge economy may be crash and 
depression is the analysis of the dynamics leading to a reduction of investment opportunities as 
a consequence of the escalation of knowledge enclosures associated to the strengthening of the 
intellectual property (IP) system and the weakening of the traditional institutions of ‘Open 
Science’. The progressive monopolization of intellectual resources gives rise to both virtuous 
and vicious feedback effects between the distribution of intellectual assets and incentives to 
learn and develop new knowledge. Even where virtuous cycles are at play, however, the more 
the share of non-privatized knowledge shrinks in favour of intellectual monopolies, the less 
global investment opportunities tend to be available and therefore the less the knowledge 
economy is able to keep its growth promises. 
The ongoing reduction of the share of publicly available knowledge resources is compounded 
by the political economy of IP protection and public funding of Open Science. At the national 
level, large firms’ rent-seeking activities and corresponding decision makers’ capture may 
explain many aspects of the evolution of national IP systems and innovation policies. 
However, this is not the end of the story. At the international level, many forces are at play 
that conjure up to increase the extent of knowledge enclosures.  
Contemporary international IP treaties such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (henceforth, also TRIPs Agreement) involve reciprocity rules such 
as that of ‘national treatment’: to obtain IP protection for their nationals in signatories to the 
Agreement, countries have to grant foreign inventors the same treatment as they grant to 
domestic inventors. Once rules of this type are in place in the international IP domain, 
countries’ incentives to (upward) harmonize their IP rules are magnified and an excessive 
degree of IP protection tends to result, not just for the majority (of nations) but arguably for all.  
More generally, the global commons nature of knowledge resources creates scope for free-
riding phenomena whereby each country has an incentive to use the public knowledge of other 
countries and to over-privatize the knowledge that it is producing, leading to a one-way ratchet 
of increasing IP protection. Both at the national and at the international level, the problem is 
reinforced by ubiquitous feedback effects: once IP institutions are in place, firms (countries) 
find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma situation whereby patenting (strengthening patent 
protection and reducing the scope of publicly available knowledge) is a dominant strategy for 
all even if choosing a strategy of greater openness would be consistent with joint welfare 
maximization.  
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In this paper, we propose that the existence of these forces endogenous to the knowledge 
economy and with self-reinforcing features should be conceived of as a new rationale and 
foundation for science policy, and particularly for a global science policy. Since there is no 
spontaneous antidote to the progressive drift towards excessive knowledge privatization, public 
policies expressly recognizing the risks inherent in over-privatization of intellectual resources 
are sorely needed. Moreover, these policies require efforts at international coordination, so as 
to avoid the inevitable distortion of incentives to invest in public research following from 
uncompensated cross-border externalities.  
Our perspective suggests not only that neoliberal prejudices against direct public investments in 
research should be abandoned, but also that the issue of whether to fund public research 
should not be considered separate from the question of the appropriate form of diffusion of 
publicly-funded research results. Absent explicit policies aimed at redressing the balance 
between private and publicly available knowledge, the knowledge economy will hardly be able 
to meet its growth-enhancing promises.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the reasons put forward to explain why 
the endgame of the knowledge economy may be crash and depression. Section 3 engages with 
the issue of the political economy of knowledge enclosures. Section 4 articulates the rationale 
for a new (global) science policy. Section 5 concludes by summarizing the main questions for 
future research.  
 
2. Why may the endgame of the knowledge economy be crash and depression? 
 
The widespread faith in the growth-enhancing features of the knowledge economy and of the 
underlying pillars of scientific and technological research and innovation has gone, in the past 
few decades, hand-in-hand with a similarly widespread belief that private property-like  
institutions may deliver in the realm of intangibles exactly the same sort of benefits they deliver 
in the tangible domain. This intellectual position has coalesced with the more mundane 
interests of the large corporations of the developed world (most of which are highly IP-
intensive), leading to an unprecedented strengthening of intellectual property protection at the 
global level (on which more will be said in section 3).  
The pervasiveness of the propertisation of intellectual resources has also been sustained by 
extraordinary technological developments that, on one side, underline the extension of 
patentable subject matter and, on the other side, increase the scope for global copy and 
imitation of inventions and intellectual creations; both of which then lead to further tightening 
of IP laws. Advancements in information and communication technologies as well as the 
growing complexity of interactions across different scientific disciplines (e.g., in the realm of 
nanomaterials, bioinformatics etc.) are increasingly blurring the once much clearer distinctions 
between basic and applied science, leading to a significant expansion of so-called “Pasteur’s 
quadrant” (Stokes, 1997), i.e. of the scope of scientific research that is simultaneously basic 
and applied.  
Products, production processes and entire industries are characterized by ever greater 
complexity and draw on inherently intertwined and cumulative innovations that are typically 
related both to numerous prior basic and applied research results and to parallel technological 
developments. With blurring lines between the realm of technology and the realm of pure 
science and the definite dismissal of the linear model of innovation (see Edgerton chapter), the 
scope of patentable subject matter has thus increased considerably. At the same time, the 
pervasive global diffusion of ICT technologies has broadened the global reach or scale of 
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technical knowledge and innovations, simultaneously expanding the scope for their 
misappropriation.  
These scientific and technological developments also hint at some of the reasons why the 
analogy between property and intellectual property that underpins many policy discourses (in 
the domain of trade policy, industrial policy as well as science policy) is misleading and 
dangerous for the knowledge economy itself. Unlike tangible property, intellectual property 
involves a much greater scope for overlap of “exclusive” rights. This makes it difficult to 
securely identify the owner of a given intellectual resource, gives rise to costly and 
unproductive conflicts in enforcement and, most importantly, may hamper its productive 
exploitation.  
The root cause of this is the inherent (quasi) ‘public good’ (see below) features of knowledge 
([ref]). This gives rise to a mismatch between the legal relations defined by private property and 
the intrinsically unbounded nature of knowledge and information as productive resources 
(Arrow, 1996, p.651). Non-rivalry of knowledge – meaning many people can use this ‘good’ at 
the same time without incurring additional marginal costs – entails that the artificial exclusion 
of third parties associated to intellectual property comes at the cost of an inefficiency.  This 
inefficiency is usually accepted as a necessary evil in exchange for greater incentives to produce 
the underlying knowledge. However, non-rivalry also entails that the size and potential extent 
of the exclusion associated to intellectual property is of an order of magnitude that is 
incomparable to that of private property. As argued by one of us elsewhere: “the full-blown 
private ownership of knowledge means a global monopoly that limits the liberty of many individuals in 
multiple locations” (Pagano, 2014, p.1413). 
Contributions from many intellectual backgrounds and with different research agendas have 
started to recognize these tensions and to highlight reasons why the undeniable trend of 
propertisation of knowledge resources may be excessive from the social standpoint and may 
end up undermining the functioning of the very engines of knowledge production.  
A first strand of the literature focuses on the drawbacks of the current intellectual property 
institutions, with special regard to the patent system. Contributions belonging to this category 
typically delve into the link between patents and innovation and highlight the existence of 
effects standing in contrast with the claim that greater patenting necessarily entails greater 
innovation. Sceptical views have been expressed by many legal scholars, especially by those 
that have been most directly exposed to the real-world mechanics of the intellectual property 
regime (e.g., Lemley, 2005; Benkler, 2002; Samuelson, 2006). However, there is by now also a 
consistent body of economics literature (well represented, for instance, by the books by Bessen 
and Meurer, 2008; Boldrin and Levine, 2008 and Jaffe and Lerner, 2006) advancing the view 
that patents may actually have in many instances a detrimental effect on innovation. This view 
has, especially after the inception of the 2008 crisis, been taken up in the broader policy 
discourse even by mainstream voices such as The Economist. 
A number of contributions has long shown theoretically that, when research is sequential and 
builds upon previous innovations, stronger patents may discourage follow-on inventions 
(Merges and Nelson, 1990; Scotchmer, 1991) and that overlapping patent rights may give rise 
to the so-called “anticommons tragedy”, an instance of underexploitation of intellectual 
resources due to the excessive proliferation of veto rights over their use (Heller and Eisenberg, 
1998).  
Similarly, from the empirical standpoint, it has long been known (at least since the 1980s) that 
in most sectors, patents are at best of limited usefulness and that firms often deem formal 
protection mechanisms less effective than the alternatives (Mansfield, 1986; Levin et al., 1987; 
Cohen et al., 2000; various editions of the Community Innovation Survey), yet their 
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propensity to patent remains high. A number of studies has pointed out that firms may be 
patenting because other firms are patenting rather than for the intrinsic usefulness of patents. A 
‘patent paradox’ may be at play: the patent system may be creating incentives to patent rather 
than to invest in R&D (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001), especially as firms refine their use of patents 
as a strategic tool to pre-empt competitors’ innovative investments, to improve bargaining 
positions in licensing and/or to defend themselves from patent litigation (see, e.g., Arundel et 
al., 1995; Duguet and Kabla, 1998; Reitzig et al., 2010).  
Other research has uncovered the distortionary effects patents may have on innovation, by 
inducing costly duplications of research efforts (inventing around), by distorting firms’ 
technological trajectories, forced away from areas with greater risks of third party IP 
infringements, and by discouraging altogether the undertaking of those innovative projects that 
are most likely to incur problems due to patent overlaps. These problems are compounded in 
areas where products are technologically complex and firms’ patent portfolios can reach a 
substantial scale – an instance often referred to as the problem of “patent thickets”1.  
Lerner (1995) finds early evidence that new and small biotechnology firms that have high 
litigation costs refrain from patenting in areas where they are more likely to infringe on 
existing patents, particularly where ownership belongs to (large) firms with low litigation costs. 
Cockburn et al. (2010) provide evidence of the fact that the need to licence-in patents reduces 
firms’ innovative performance, by performing a survey of German innovating firms. Noel and 
Schankerman (2013), in a study focused on the patenting in the computer software industry 
between 1980 and 1999, find that companies facing a high concentration of patent portfolios of 
their main rivals refrain from investing in R&D in those areas where rivals’ patent portfolios 
are stronger. 
A contiguous domain of research is that considering academic patenting. The 1980 U.S. Bayh-
Dole Act has allowed the patentability of federally funded research results, opening the way to 
a trend of increasing propertisation of publicly funded science that has rapidly expanded into 
many OECD countries (and increasingly beyond – e.g. see Suttmeier chapter on China). The 
purported rationale for this shift in science policy is many-fold: to ease commercialization, to 
counteract the effect of shrinking public funding for science and, more generally, to re-orient 
academic and Public Research Organizations’ (PROs) research towards directions suitable to 
better contribute to the growth-enhancing promises of the knowledge economy. In this regard, 
research has mainly focused on a double link: between patenting and speed of scientific 
advancement; and between academic patenting (particularly of research tools) and diffusion of 
research results (for a concise survey, see Franzoni and Shellato, 2011).  
Three main results of this literature are relevant for the purposes of the present paper. The first 
is that Universities and Public Research Organizations appear not to be very good at the 
patenting game, both if one looks at the share of their patents over total patenting (about 5% of 
active patents in the US, according to Thursby and Thursby, 2007, and a similar share in 
Europe according to Lissoni et al., 2008) and at the amount of revenues they are able to raise 
(Geuna and Nesta, 2006).  
In addition to raising doubts about the effectiveness of academic patenting in promoting 
commercialization, this should be sufficient to raise the question whether, from the PROs’ 
standpoint, the prospective benefits of patents outweigh the certain restriction to the freedom 
of research involved by the inevitable curtailment of the research exemption2. Indeed, while 
                                                
1 Shapiro (2001) refers to “patent thickets” as to dense webs of overlapping patent rights, mostly belonging to 
multiple firms’ large patent portfolios. 
2 In the United States, the key judicial decision sanctioning the curbing of universities’ research exemption is 
considered to be the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision Madey v. Duke University (307 F.3d 1351, 1362 
(Fed. Cir. 2002). In this decision, the Court has held that the exemption “does not apply to activities conducted in 
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universities have traditionally enjoyed a relatively wide exemption from infringement of patent 
protection for the purpose of scientific experimentation, as academic patenting and overlaps 
between public and private research increase, it remains to be seen whether PROs activities 
will continue to be considered entirely part of scientific experimentation and thus shielded 
from liability.  
Second, evidence exists that academic patenting hampers diffusion of research results. One 
particularly interesting paper considers the ‘natural experiment’ given by the release into the 
public domain of patents related to a genetically engineered mouse (Murray et al., 2009). The 
authors find that the extent of research in the area significantly increased and became more 
diversified, with the opening of new research trajectories that were not pursued when patents 
were in place. With a different methodology, Franzoni and Scellato (2010) find significant 
delays in publication in scientific journals when results are patented. Finally, Campbell et al. 
(2002) and Walsh et al. (2007) find evidence of the withholding of information, data and 
materials on which research is based.  
Third, not much can be said on the effect of patenting on the speed of scientific advancement. 
While simple trade-offs between publishing and patenting do not seem to be at play if one 
looks at the productivity of single researchers (e.g., Azoulay et al. 2009), there currently is no 
research addressing the key issue, from a broader systems perspective of the productivity of 
science more generally, of whether substantial negative externalities for other researchers in the 
same field are associated to patents (Franzoni and Scellato, 2011). 
While the contributions so far mentioned have focused on direct causal links between 
patenting and innovation or patenting and scientific advancement, the authors of the present 
chapter have, in previous works, proposed the view that the links between IPRs and innovative 
investments have a self-reinforcing nature, which is at the root of both patterns of unequal 
distribution of intellectual resources and chances for growth and of a global progressive 
reduction in investment opportunities. This, in turn, points to the existence of a mechanism 
endogenous to the knowledge economy that may be part of the explanation of its crisis.  
The starting point for the recognition of the self-reinforcing relationships existing in the 
intellectual property domain is the mentioned difference between the property of tangibles and 
intellectual property. The key efficiency argument underlying the existence of private property 
institutions is linked to the incentive effect property is able to generate. Owners have incentives 
to maintain, improve and productively use their tangible property. Most importantly, they 
have incentives to invest in specific and value-increasing human capital, as recognized by 
proponents of the new property rights approach (e.g., Hart, 1995). Pagano and Rossi (2004) 
have highlighted that this incentive effect is much stronger for intellectual than for physical 
property because IP owners enjoy a right not just to use but to exclude that has a much broader 
scope, as it entails a restriction of the liberty of third parties to replicate similar means of 
production. This, in turn, is at the origin of important feedback effects: while owners have 
heightened incentives to invest in IP-specific learning and human capital and to further acquire 
intellectual assets, non-owners are disincentivized from investing in the acquisition of 
intellectual capital. Both virtuous circles of accumulation and vicious circles of exclusion from 
intellectual capital ensue, with evident self-reinforcing properties.  
This perspective makes a step further from the mentioned analyses focusing on the effects of 
firm and patent portfolio size on R&D investment and patenting patterns by highlighting the 
                                                                                                                                                            
the contest of the normal “business” of a research institution, either for-profit or not-for-profit”. It is clear that the 
more PROs engage in patenting, the more their activities will be considered part of business, unworthy of a 
research exemption. In Europe, acts “done privately and for purposes which are not commercial” and acts “done 
for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the invention” have traditionally been shielded from 
liability.  
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self-reinforcing nature that these effects may have at both firms’ and countries’ level. At the 
firm’s level, ever-increasing knowledge propertisation has the effect of preventing the 
development of more democratic forms of organization of production. This is paradoxical, 
considering that the higher knowledge content of contemporary production would appear 
prima facie  to enable greater democratization of production (Pagano and Rossi, 2011; Pagano, 
2014). When monopoly rights are in place and much knowledge relevant to production may be 
codified, disembodied and legally protected, capitalist firms enjoy a cost advantage with 
respect to workers-owned firms because their size and the artificial excludability induced by IP 
feeds into a dramatic form of (firm-level artificially restricted) increasing returns.  
The self-reinforcing effects of intellectual ownership are even more profound at the country 
level. IPR endowments tend to be at the origin of new forms of comparative advantage in the 
‘knowledge economy’ (Belloc and Pagano, 2012): given pervasive and global IPRs, countries 
find obstacles in specializing in those productions that depend heavily on IP-protected 
knowledge held by other countries. This gives rise to patterns of forced specialization that feed 
into global trade, constituting a novel cause for increased international exchange, along with 
the classical explanations provided by trade theory. What is most relevant is that these patterns 
of forced specialization tend to perpetuate in time, giving rise to trajectories of development 
and underdevelopment associated to the unequal initial distribution of IP endowments into IP-, 
and hence rent-, rich and poor worlds.  
Pagano and Rossi (2009) and Pagano (2014) have argued that this sort of feedback effects do 
not impact only on the relative gains and losses of asymmetrically endowed countries, but also 
on the overall availability of investment opportunities, and thus, on growth at the global 
system level. The overall effect of the global strengthening of IP protection may, indeed, have 
been a global contraction of the chances for productive investment, which may be considered 
to underlie the recent crisis. The lack of good investment opportunities, together with abundant 
capital and lax financial regulations may explain why capital was redirected away from 
productive uses, thus giving rise to the housing bubble and the ensuing subprime crisis (Pagano 
and Rossi, 2009; on financialisation, see also chapters by Lazonick et al. and Birch). 
Moreover, knowledge propertisation contributes to the financialisation of the economy, as it 
turns intellectual resources into securely owned and tradable assets that, having no value 
defined in a competitive market, are easily exposed to the vagaries of speculative expectations 
(Pagano, 2014).  
The evolution of global investment appears coherent with the view that global IPRs are 
progressively curtailing investment opportunities. As can be seen from figure 1, after the major 
event triggering the global strengthening of IPRs (the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights - TRIPs) (e.g., May and Sell, 2006), global investment 
rose for about five years and then started a continuous decline. Our contention is that this 
global decline is to be attributed to the progressive erosion of the availability of non-privatized 
knowledge. 
 
Figure 1. Global patents and global investments 
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Source: Belloc and Pagano (2012) 
 
Thus, the uneven distribution of knowledge is an important cause of overall economic 
inequality and a brake to global growth. In a much acclaimed book Piketty (2014) has 
emphasized how a rate of profit greater than the rate of growth must necessarily lead to a 
growing relative impoverishment of the majority of the population. Piketty attributes the origin 
of the phenomenon to over-accumulation of capital. However, a careful reading of the 
evidence suggests that a more convincing explanation must be found in the under-investment 
of real capital goods (Rowthorn 2014), which has characterised the recent decades. This under-
investment is consistent with the increase in wealth of the firms because the latter has been 
often due to an increase in their monopoly rents (and also of the overall profit rate earned on 
their capital). As argued by Stiglitz (2015 p. 24): “[i]f monopoly power of firms increases, it 
will show up as an increase in the income of capital, and the present discounted value of that 
will show up as an increase in wealth (since claims on the rents associated with that market 
power can be bought and sold.”  
Knowledge propertisation, although so far disregarded, may be an important part of the 
explanation for the puzzling simultaneous occurrence of under-investment, wealth 
accumulation, high profit and low growth. When much knowledge moves from the public to 
the private sphere the increased monopolization is likely to increase profits and to decrease 
growth. And, moreover, almost by definition, subtracting from public knowledge resources 
increases inequality: everyone has equal rights of access to a public good. By contrast, the 
privatization of knowledge involves that only the monopolistic owner has full access to it. 
Thus increased rents (including also those that do not arise from the monopolization of 
knowledge) are likely to cause both declining growth and increasing inequality. The actual 
dismal economic record of recent years thoroughly corroborates these theoretical expectations.  
 
3. The political economy of knowledge enclosures  
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As mentioned in passing in the previous paragraph, the turning point in global IPRs protection 
is given by the 1994 TRIPs agreement. This is the first international agreement on IP-related 
matters that, in addition to (upward) harmonizing an almost all-encompassing range of aspects 
of the legal protection of intellectual creations at the global level, explicitly foresees a 
mechanism of enforcement, under the oversight of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Since the TRIPs agreement, a number of less comprehensive but equally relevant agreements 
have contributed to further strengthening global IP protection. TRIPs-plus provisions (meaning 
those even stronger than TRIPs) have been introduced in countries such as Australia, Chile, 
Peru, countries of the Middle East and others as part of the negotiation of Preferential Trading 
Areas (PTAs) with the United States and the European Union. Horizontal agreements among 
developing countries (e.g., within members of ASEAN) have also raised their harmonized IP 
standards and procedures. IP-reinforcing provisions are also common in many bilateral 
investment treaties and international investment agreements (Maskus, 2014). 
The rent-seeking activities of large (and IP-endowed) firms in developed countries have been 
an important trigger of these developments. This is particularly true for US firms who, at the 
onset of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, were perceived as falling behind their German 
and Japanese counterparts and were eager to increase the extent of monopoly and oligopoly 
rents they could appropriate in international markets. These private interests may have 
translated into industry capture of trade negotiators (Lanjouw and Cockburn, 2001).   
However, countries’ policy makers may have excessive incentives to strengthen global 
intellectual property protection even assuming away problems of politicians’ capture. 
Scotchmer (2004) suggests that harmonization of IP protection leads to broader IP protection 
than would be chosen if choices were independent and to stronger protection than would be 
optimal from a social standpoint. In addition, she also shows that, under the requirements of 
reciprocity (national treatment) embodied in the TRIPs agreement, countries have an incentive 
to tilt the policy mix in favour of IP and away from public sponsorship of research and 
innovation because the former, unlike the latter, allows to internalize cross-border knowledge 
externalities. 
More generally, the fact that knowledge is a global commons and is therefore exposed to the 
usual free rider problems that plague this sort of good may contribute to explain why each 
country has an incentive to use the public knowledge of other countries and to over-privatize 
the knowledge that it is producing, even more so if globally harmonized protection is in place. 
Hence each country is pushed towards a portfolio of instruments for intellectual property 
management that increases the weight of patenting well beyond what would happen in a 
closed economy and beyond the socially efficient level. This, in turn, amounts to a form of 
national free-riding on the global knowledge commons that can be seen as an instance of unfair 
competition. Seen from this angle, it is thus striking that this form of unfair competition goes 
unnoticed at the WTO level, while the forms of unfair competition associated to IP violations 
are severely sanctioned, even by allowing retaliation through trade restrictions (Pagano, 2014). 
This free-riding-based incentive to favour privatized knowledge over Open Science (Dasgupta 
and David, 1994) has gone hand-in-hand with the substantial changes public research systems 
have been undergoing since the mid-nineties. The more knowledge has been recognized as a 
key ingredient of growth, the more universities and PROs have been oriented towards serving 
the training and research support needs of the economy. Reforms have been made to 
strengthen and intensify public-private collaborations, actively to promote patenting and 
patent-backed technology transfer with the institution of specialized technology transfer offices 
(TTOs), and to direct research efforts towards specific societal needs through the increased 
competitive allocation of funds (Geuna and Rossi, 2015). These developments are changing 
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the overall attitude of publicly funded science institutions as well as of individual researchers 
and profoundly affecting the set of norms conventionally associated to Open Science.  
This tends to extend to public research the sort of feedback effects that appear at play for firms 
and countries alike: once IP institutions are in place, producers of knowledge (be they 
researchers, firms or countries) find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma situation whereby 
patenting is a dominant but sub-optimal strategy even if choosing not to patent would be 
consistent with joint welfare maximization.  
Thus, also if seen from the political economy angle, the present (international) institutions of 
the knowledge economy appear to embody an endogenous mechanism that tends to perpetuate 
their very existence as well as their negative implications for learning, growth and inequality. 
Most importantly, with the once Open Science-oriented public research institutions ever more 
active at the IP game, there currently seems to be a lack of endogenous antidotes to the ever-
increasing enclosure of public knowledge. In the next section, we argue that the pressing need 
for such antidote should be conceived of as a new rationale and foundation for science policy, 
and particularly for a global science policy. Absent such antidote, the knowledge economy will 
hardly be able to meet its growth-enhancing promises.  
 
4. A new rationale for a global science policy 
The economic literature has pointed to the existence of a multiplicity of rationales for science 
(and technology) policy. In the neo-classical approach (Arrow, 1962; Dasgupta and David, 
1994) the main foundation of science policy is the existence of market failures linked to the 
public good nature of the knowledge that constitutes basic science. While technology can be 
privately appropriated through IPRs, fundamental research creates maximum spillover effects, 
which motivate public investment in their production to make up for lacking private 
incentives.  
The literature on systems or networks of innovation (e.g., Freeman, 1995; Lundvall, 2007), by 
contrast, identifies the justification for public intervention in science and technology in the 
existence of innovation system failures. Since innovation depends on the complementarities 
and the links between multiple actors and resources, which may be subject to coordination and 
incentive alignment problems, there may be a role for public policy in helping to address these 
problems. 
Evolutionary thinkers (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988) highlight an additional role 
for science policy, residing in the need to promote knowledge diffusion and generation of 
diversity, so as to redress the consequences of path-dependent evolutionary trajectories.  
Finally, proponents of the knowledge-based approach (e.g., Cohendet and Meyer-Krahmer, 
2001) emphasize the collective nature of knowledge production, sharing and distribution and 
the importance of learning processes, finding in the existence of learning (cognitive) failures 
the justification for science and technology policy.  
The perspective we propose in this paper (and in previous related work) offers a new rationale 
for (global) science policy. We have advanced so far two main contentions. The first is that 
excessive knowledge privatization should be considered responsible for the squeeze and 
distortion of investment opportunities and, ultimately, for hampering growth and increasing 
global inequality. The second is that the political economy underlying international global IP 
protection and investment in public research tends to magnify the effects of knowledge 
privatization, leaving “intellectual monopoly capitalism” (Pagano, 2014) with no endogenous 
mechanism to redress the imbalances caused by knowledge propertisation. From these two 
contentions we draw three main conclusions for science policy.  
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First, the (quasi) public good nature of knowledge should not only be interpreted as a rationale 
underlying the need for public funding to substitute for private incentives, thus addressing a 
market failure. An even more pernicious failure of the system itself derives from the excessive 
reduction of the domain of non-propertised knowledge, due to the fact that knowledge 
ownership gives rise to the self-reinforcing positive and negative dynamics and to the overall 
squeeze in investment opportunities highlighted in the previous paragraphs. Open Science, 
intended as scientific knowledge that preserves its public good features, is thus key to unlock 
the growth-enhancing features of the knowledge economy.  
Second, and relatedly, it is necessary to broaden the set of tools of science policy with more 
openness-preserving tools. Mazzucato (2013) has convincingly shown that substantial public 
investment in science underpins many of the most successful privately appropriated 
innovations of our time. This certainly backs the claim that public funding of research should 
be preserved and enhanced. However, given the present institutional framework skewed in 
favour of privatization of the results of basic research, increasing public research funding may 
not be enough. In other words, we propose that the question whether and how much public 
research should be funded should not be considered separate from the more fundamental 
question whether privatization of public research results through IP should be encouraged. The 
efficiency-enhancing features of publicly funded research reside in the broad range of 
externalities it is able to propagate throughout the economy. Absent these features, it is unclear 
why public research should be funded at all. 
Third, the global dimension of knowledge production and its associated political economy 
dynamics should be explicitly taken into account as a foundation for science policy. Differently 
from the case of IP, in the domain of Open Science there are not (yet!) international 
institutions that ensure harmonization of public sponsorship policies so as to address the 
disincentive effects of cross-border externalities (Schotchmer, 2004; Pagano and Rossi, 2009). 
Undeniable difficulties notwithstanding, ways should be found to devise science policies with a 
global dimension. International coordination is sorely needed to ensure that the main engine of 
growth – knowledge production – does not run out of its indispensable fuel: freely accessible 
scientific knowledge.  
A few possible tools have been already proposed in this connection. Stiglitz (1999) has 
suggested that it would be justified on both efficiency and equity grounds for the international 
community to “claim the right to charge for the use of the global knowledge commons.” One way to 
achieve a similar outcome could be to foresee a minimum investment requirement in open 
science (e.g., 3 per cent of GNP) to all the countries that are members of the WTO 
organization (Pagano, 2014). Alternatively, funding of international knowledge institutions 
and internationally-backed patent buyouts may be part of the set of tools (Pagano and Rossi, 
2009). There is certainly a dearth of creative policy solutions in this important domain: the 
search for ways to overcome the negative consequences of excessive knowledge privatization 
should be a necessary part of the agenda of a political economy of science. 
 
5. Conclusions and questions for future research 
 
In this chapter, we have proposed the existence of a new foundation for a (global) science 
policy: the need to counteract the nefarious consequences of excessive knowledge 
privatization. The growth-enhancing promises of the knowledge economy may never be 
realized due to its endogenous tendency to drift towards excessive knowledge privatization. 
Excessive exclusion and blockage in the utilization of knowledge resources has already 
manifested its effects not only in the patterns of international production specialization and 
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unequal growth, but also in the curtailment of the growth potential of the countries that enjoy 
the best endowments of privatized intellectual capital. In addition, the political economy of 
global intellectual property protection and of investments in public research suggests that this 
squeeze in investment and growth opportunities does not find easy antidotes.  
This also suggests a range of new questions for a political economy of science. First, the 
mechanisms underlying the virtuous and vicious feed-back effects existing between the 
distribution of intellectual assets and learning and knowledge investment should be further 
explored, with the purpose of identifying ways to break vicious circles and unlock the potential 
of the knowledge economy. Second, more research is needed to understand fully the global 
consequences of the changing attitudes and practices of publicly funded research that are 
progressively moving away from the norms of Open Science to embrace norms of ‘closed 
science’. To what extent open access movements and policies promoted by some universities 
and research groups may be an appropriate solution? What alternatives are available (see 
chapters by [])? Third, a further crucial question concerns the identification of ways to 
overcome the ingrained resistance to devise global solutions for the production of Open 
Science and, more generally, of publicly available knowledge.  
These questions by no means exhaust the range of issues relevant to the research agenda of a 
new, global, political economy of science policy. We believe, however, that they are a 
necessary starting point if further crash and depression of the knowledge economy are to be 
avoided. 
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